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The background o f  this paper is found  
in recent theories why corruption preva­
lence menaces the safety o f  business envi­
ronment. In order to examine i f  exposure 
to corruption derogates business results 
o f  firm s in Croatia we have tested the 
hypothesis that higher corruption percep­
tions o f  business leaders in small, medium 
and large firm s in Croatia are associ­
ated with firm s’ worse financial results. 
As a seminal research we measure corrup­
tion perceptions o f  business by employing 
unique data from  three annual surveys 
conducted in more than one hundredfirms 
in Croatia. The constructed index o f  cor­
ruption perceptions o f  business is used 
in the empirical analysis how higher cor­
ruption perceptions o f  firm s in Croatia 
are affecting financial results in terms o f  
total revenue p er  employee, net profit per  
employee and total sales per employee. 
The years o f  observation are 2002, 2003 
and 2004. The extension o f  our research 
to three groups o f  small, medium and large 
firm s in Croatia aims to separately exam­
ine the correlation between corruption 
perceptions indices and financial results
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fo r  each group o f  firms. The preliminary 
results indicate that corruption is more 
affecting small firm s in Croatia. Policy rec­
ommendations and lines o f  further research 
are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption is attracting growing attention in 
current research because of its recognized negative 
effects to growth and development (Mauro, 1995). 
Corruption acts as an arbitrary tax increasing the 
cost of doing business and reallocating resources 
towards less efficient usage (for literature review, 
see Jain, 2001). One of the most widely used defi­
nitions of corruption is “the abuse of public office 
for private gain” (World Bank, 1997). Corruption 
activities involve public sector, notwithstanding 
if transactions are performed within public sector 
itself or if they comprise deals between private 
firms (or individuals) and public officials or public 
administration employees2. In this paper we focus 
on corruption transactions between private and 
public sector, examining the link between corrup­
tion perceptions of economic agents and business 
performance of firms in Croatia.
In order to examine if exposure to corruption 
derogates business results of firms in Croatia we 
have tested the hypothesis that higher corruption 
perceptions of business leaders in small, medium 
and large firms in Croatia are associated with worse 
financial results.
As a seminal research we have measured 
corruption perceptions of business by employing 
unique data from three annual surveys conducted
2 Corruption may occur in private sector only, e.g. when a 
firm employee favors one supplier in exchange for perso­
nal award, but it is considered that corruption in private 
sector is less widespread or at least that there are mecha­
nisms of internal control sanctioning such a misbehavior 
(see Mauro, 1997 and World Bank, 1997).
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in more than one hundred firms in Croatia. The 
constructed index of corruption perceptions of busi­
ness was used in the empirical analysis how higher 
corruption perceptions of small, medium and large 
firms in Croatia are affecting financial results in 
terms of total revenue per employee, net profit per 
employee and total sales per employee. The years of 
observation are 2002, 2003 and 2004.
Following this introductory section, the paper 
is organized as follows. The next section presents 
recent theories why corruption prevalence menaces 
the safety of business environment. Findings are 
supported by the evidence of Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) in the 
part of corruption focused on the new European 
Union member states and candidate countries. In 
the third section we explain methodology and data 
sources used in the analysis of corruption percep­
tions of firms in Croatia and their financial results. 
Empirical modeling results sire given in the section 
that follows, while the last section concludes.
ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE 
OF CORRUPTION-FREE BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT
Corruption is recognized today as one of the 
main obstacles of doing business. However, empiri­
cal research on corruption perceptions influence on 
business results in national economies is still rather 
rare. First of all, the clandestine nature of corruption 
makes the real costs of corruption immeasurable. 
Therefore the perceptions of corruptions are used 
as measures of corruption. Indicators of corruption 
reflect subjective opinions of analysts, business 
people, and citizens on the corruption prevalence. 
Two most commonly used indicators of corrup­
tion perceptions are Corruption Perceptions Index 
of Transparency International iwww.transparency. 
org) and Control of Corruption of the World Bank 
(Kaufman et al., 2002). Those indicators enable 
comparative analysis of the overall level of corrup­
tion perceptions by country, but provide no insight 
into corruption in particular economic activity, 
region or society group. The lack of analysis at 
micro level is usually connected with the problem 
of collecting the reliable time series data on corrup­
tion perceptions for targeted sub-national sample.
On the other hand, international organizations 
emphasise the role of the private sector as crucial
at the supply side of corruption transactions3, in 
particular of political corruption (Transparency 
International, 2004)4. There is abundant literature 
on business approaches to combat corrupt prac­
tices (Gordon and Wynhoven, 2003), but very little 
empirical research on firms being exposed to cor­
rupt practices and how this exposure affects their 
financial results.
However, the recent empirical evidence con­
firms that corruption substantially reduces firm 
performance. The survey on private firms in Latin 
America used to assess the effects of corruption 
on firm competitiveness, provided arguments that 
corruption reduced sales growth (Gaviria, 2001). 
McArthur and Teal (2002) found that companies in 
Africa that pay bribes have 20 per cent lower output 
in terms of value of total sales per worker. Empirical 
research on causes and consequences of corruption 
at the firm level in Uganda found that 81 per cent 
of firms surveyed reported paying bribes; the firms 
receiving public infrastructure services, engaged in 
trade or paying more taxes face a higher exposure to 
bribe-seeking. Variations in bribes were explained 
by the financial strength of the surveyed firms 
determining firms’ ability to pay bribes and firms’ 
“refusal power” to avoid paying bribes (Svensson, 
2003). Such empirical investigation including cross- 
section analysis of firms in a country is useful for 
policy decision-makers to target better their anti­
corruption policy measures.
How corruption is affecting the 
business environment quality - evidence 
for EU new member states and 
candidate countries
There is a rising awareness of how corruption- 
free business environment is crucial to the success 
of national economy, especially for the economies 
in transition. Namely those countries are perceived 
to have high prevalence of corruption while the 
expansion of private sector is at the same time con­
sidered as a generator of growth in emerging econo­
mies. Therefore the World Bank and the EBRD
3 Private sector might generate the demand for corruption 
deals as well; firms seeking to evade regulations by 
bribing inspectors or lobbying politicians to resist legal 
reforms are the common cases of such a corrupt behavior. 
Private sector-initiated corruption occurs in weak institu­
tional environment (see Damania et al., 2003).
4 See also OECD www.oecd.org.
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have jointly developed the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) con­
ducted in transition countries in 1999 and 20025. 
BEEPS presents opinions of managers of over 4000 
firms in 1999 and 6100 firms in 2002 on corruption, 
state capture and lobbying that can be related to 
firm performance. The growing interest in the qual­
ity of business environment is confirmed by the lat­
est appearance of other studies such as comparative 
study of business environment in Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (Komer et al., 2002). 
One has to notice that within institutional determi­
nants of safe business environment, all empirical 
research in this field include corruption as one of 
the aspects of governance quality.
Table 1: Firms’ exposure to corrupt practices in regular business operations, 2002
It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular additional payments/
gifts ”to get things done”
with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc.
Country Frequently, usually or always 
(share of total responses)
Index of corruption exposure 
NMS-8 and CAC-3 average=100
Bulgaria 32.7% 156.0
Croatia 12.9% 61.5









NMS-8 and CAC-3 average 21.0% 100.0
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey BEEPS 2002, EBRD-World Bank Business
As an introduction to our analysis of corrup­
tion perceptions of business in Croatia we have 
chosen the year 2002 BEEPS results targeting the 
same areas of corruption as we have examined for 
Croatian firms in 2002,2003 and 2004. Furthermore, 
we have compared selected BEEPS results for the 
particular group of transition countries sharing the 
same process of accessing the European Union (EU) 
to which Croatia belongs. Therefore we have ana­
lysed the comparative characteristics of corruption 
and state capture that firms in eight new EU member 
states (NMS-8) and in three candidate countries 
(CAC-3) faced in year 2002.
Firms’ exposure to corrupt practices in doing 
regular business operations such as to bribe-seeking 
from corrupt officials for obtaining trade permits, 
when paying taxes or asking for other public admin­
istration services is evident from the survey results 
(Table 1). In our sample of 11 EU new member 
states and candidate countries, 21% of firms con­
sider that irregular payments are frequent, usual 
or always needed to get done business operations
related to customs, licenses, taxes, regulations and 
services. Firms in Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria 
are in those everyday business operations the most 
exposed to the corrupt practices. Opinion of firms 
in Croatia denotes much less corruption exposure, 
about 40% below the NMS-8 and CAC-3 average. 
Slovenian firms reported to be the less exposed to 
the corrupt practices.
5 www.ebrd.org/pubs/index.htm
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Table 2: Firms’ exposure to state capture, 2002
Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Government officials to affect the content of gov- 
eminent decrees have a direct impact to mv business_________________________  ___
Country
Major and/or decisive impact 
(share of total responses)
Index of state capture
NMS-8 and CAC-3 average=100
Bulgaria 14.2% 273.1
Croatia 4.9% 94.2









NMS-8 and CAC-3 average 5.2% 100.0
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey BEEPS 2002, EBRD-World Bank Business
Political corruption affecting business of firms 
in NMS-8 and CAC-3 is evident from the Table 2. 
In the selected group of countries, 5.2% of firms 
surveyed in 2002 consider private payments to 
government officials have major or/and decisive 
impact to their business. In Bulgaria, the respon­
se rate is 2.7 times above the selected countries’ 
average while the lowest state capture is observed 
in Slovenia again. Croatian firms’ response rate of 
4.9% is in line with the group’s average (Croatian 
index of state capture is 94.2).
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
To examine the link between corruption and 
financial performance of Croatian firms, we consi­
dered the size of the firm as a distinctive attribute to 
be included in our model. Corruption is often coer­
cive for small firms emerging in a very competitive 
market, while large companies can better protect 
themselves from “petty” corruption and have res­
pectable market power to transfer costs of corrup­
tion to the end-consumers (Tanzi, 1998). Empirical 
evidence indicated that corruption transactions have 
a constant relative share of Croatian enterprises’ 
business operation cost. When corruption costs have 
effects similar to the flat tax rate, they cause more 
burdens to small firms operating in industries with 
lower capital turnover ratio (Budak, 2005).
Corruption perceptions of firms in 
Croatia
To measure the perceptions of corruption of 
economic agents in Croatia we have employed the 
raw data collected by structured interviews with 
managers of about hundred firms in Croatia in year 
2002, 2003 and 2004. The survey is annually con­
ducted among firms for the Global Competitiveness 
Report (GCR) and it captures the perceptions and 
observations of business leaders in a given coun­
try6. The original responses to the selected ques­
tions regarding the corruption prevalence as seen by 
Croatian managers were employed to construct the 
Index of corruption perceptions of business (CPB). 
The responses were classified according to the size 
of a firm (Table 3).
6 Croatia was for the first time included in the Global 
Competitiveness Report in 2002 (World Economic 
Forum
Global • Competitiveness ‘ Programmc%5CGlobal t Comp 
etitiveness+Report). The partner institution in Croatia is 
National Competitiveness Council twww.konkurentnost. 
hr). Authors would like to thank Ms. Ružica Šimić to 
provide us with the selected responses from the survey. 
The raw data are agreed to be used in aggregate form for 
scientific research purpose only and not to be distributed 
in public.
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Table 3: Number of firms surveyed per size - in number of employees; 2002, 2003, 2004
Size of a firm Number of firms surveyed
Number of employees Group 2002 2003 2004
up to 100 small 23 45 63
from 100 to 500 medium 61 42 28
more than 500 large 40 22 18
Total number of firms 124 109 109
Source: Opinion survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of World Economic Forum and Harvard University in 
Croatia, 2002., 2003, 2004.
Although in the standardized GCR question- the forms of corrupt activities which may influence 
naire many questions consider corruption percep- the firm financial results the most. Questions took 
tions, we have selected eight questions that tackle into account in the analysis are listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Selected survey questions on corruption perceptions of firms in Croatia
No. Question Score 1 Score 7
Ql
When deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials favor well- 




Q2 Diversion ofpublic funds to companies, individuals or groups due to corrup­tion in your country is common never occurs
Q3 In my industry I estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with import and export permits is common never occurs
Q4 In my industry I estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with loan applications is common never occurs
Q5 In my industry I estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with connection to public utilities (e.g. telephone or electricity) is common never occurs
Q6
In my industry I estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or 
bribes connected with influencing o f laws and policies, regulations, or decrees 
to favor selected business interests
is common never occurs
Q7
In my industry I estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or 
bribes connected with the awarding o f public contracts (investment projects) is common never occurs
Q8
In my industry I estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or 
bribes connected with annual tax payments is common never occurs
Source: Opinion survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of World Economic Forum and Harvard University in 
Croatia, 2002, 2003, 2004.
An answer option offered to each question was 
a score on the scale from 1-highly corrupted to 7- 
highly clean. By pulling out the raw data from the 
questionnaire, for each question only the responses 
scored 1, 2 and 3 were taken into account as a raw 
data input for the analysis. Namely, those are the 
scores denoting higher corruption perceptions so 
they are employed to calculate the percentage of 
firms expressing higher corruption perceptions in 
that segment.
The share of responses scored 1, 2 and 3 was 
calculated for each of three groups of firms-for 
small, medium and large enterprises separately.
The total share of responses to one question denot­
ing higher corruption perceptions was calculated 
by weighting the ratio of small, medium and large 
firms in the total number firms that have answered 
to that particular question (Table 5).
The survey opinion results indicate grow­
ing perceptions of corruption as seen by business 
people in Croatian firms (in average from 37% of 
responders in 2002 to 44% in 2004). The highest 
perceptions of corruption prevalence are observed 
in all three groups of firms in Croatia regarding the 
presence of political corruption (question 1). The 
share of managers who consider that firm should
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be well-connected to the government officials to 
compete successfully to the public procurement 
or investment projects is rising, reaching 82% of 
responses in 2004. The notable increase of corrup­
tion perceptions of the large firms indicate that large 
companies in Croatia are increasingly oriented to 
seek personal ties to approach government funds. 
That finding is confirmed by the answers to ques­
tion 2 and question 7 regarding the embezzlement 
of public funds. 52 per cent of managers in 2004 
considered that dispersion of public funds to private 
sector due to corruption is common, compared to 
“just” 34% in 2002.
Besides growing perceptions of corruption- 
influenced economic policy decisions, even more 
worrying is widespread estimate that almost half 
of firms in the industry pay bribes to secure legal 
framework and regulations that would favour their 
business interests (question 6). Additional 44% of 
responders in 2004 considered bribes as a common 
tool to get favourable court decision7. The deroga­
tion of rule of law by corruption transactions is one
7 Answers to that particular question were omitted from the 
analysis of corruption perceptions of business in Croatia 
because we consider it only indirectly affects the financial 
results of firms in Croatia.
of the most destructive effects of corruption in a 
society.
Small firms are much more exposed to bribe­
seeking when asking for connections to public utili­
ties, export and import permits or loan applications. 
The lowest corruption perceptions are observed to 
get connection to public utilities (in average 22 % 
of responses in 2004), probably because the basic 
infrastructure such as telephone and electricity is 
accessible within the whole territory of Croatia 
(question 5). It is estimated that one third of all 
companies in 2004 tended to solve export and
import permits and loan applications problems by 
bribing officials (question 3 and 4).
Corruption prevalence as seen by managers of 
Croatian firms is more affecting business of small 
firms compared to large ones. The increased percep­
tions of corruption are observed for both small and 
large firms in year 2004 compared to 2002 (Figure 
1 ) .
Table 5: Responses indicating higher corruption perceptions of small, medium and large firms, in % of total 
responses, in 2002, 2003, 2004
Question Q l Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Average
2004 % of responses scored 1, 2, 3 denoting higher corruption perceptions
small 85.5 55.7 42.4 45.8 28.3 65.0 65.0 26.6 51.8
medium 75.0 42.9 21.4 14.3 14.3 42.9 42.9 17.9 33.9
large 83.0 50.0 29.4 17.6 11.8 52.9 52.9 5.9 37.9
all firms 82.4 51.5 34.8 32.8 21.8 46.3 57.1 20.9 43.5
2003 % of responses scored 1, 2, 3 denoting higher corruption perceptions
small 70.5 55.6 43.9 58.5 35.0 51.2 68.3 34.1 52.1
medium 81.0 45.0 36.6 42.5 12.2 43.6 45.0 22.5 41.1
large 68.2 22.7 27.3 18.2 18.2 40.9 40.9 18.2 31.8
all firms 74.1 44.9 37.5 43.7 22.3 46.6 53.2 26.2 43.6
2002 % of responses scored 1, 2, 3 denoting higher corruption perceptions
small 74.0 39.0 26.0 39.0 22.0 39.0 61.0 26.0 40.8
medium 77.0 40.0 30.0 34.0 21.0 36.0 46.0 28.0 39.0
large 78.0 21.0 25.0 28.0 18.0 35.0 36.0 13.0 31.8
all firms 76.8 34.0 27.7 33.0 20.2 36.2 45.6 22.9 37.1
Source of original data: Opinion survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of World Economic Forum and Harvard 
University in Croatia, 2002, 2003, 2004.
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Figure 1: Comparison o f  corruption perceptions per eight questions on corruption prevalence, as seen by 
small and large firms in Croatia in 2002 and 2004
Source of original data: Opinion survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of World Economic Forum and Harvard 
University in Croatia, 2002, 2003, 2004.
Financial results of Croatian firms
Assuming that exposure to corruption has 
negative effects to the economic performance of 
the firms, as a measure of Croatian firms’ business 
results we have used their financial results. As a 
proxy for financial results we have taken the annual 
total revenues, net profits and total sales data. There 
is a comprehensive back up why we have used those 
indicators as a measure of financial results. First of 
all, corruption acts as an arbitrary tax increasing 
costs. However, due to the clandestine nature of 
corruption, the corruption payments are not evident 
in business operation costs, and therefore the total 
costs data are not considered the appropriate vari­
able to be directly connected with the corruption. 
Our aim at this point of preliminary research is not 
to measure the corruption costs or to assign them to 
the operational costs of the firms. We have rather 
intended to examine if  corrupt environment is influ­
encing the success of the firms. In our simplified 
model, the total revenue, net profit and total sales 
stand as a wide measure of financial success of the 
entrepreneurs8. The raw data on financial results as 
well as on the number of employees are provided 
by the Croatian Financial Agency FINA (Appendix 
A).
8 Accounting policies, macroeconomic environment, 
market position of national firms and other factors influen­
cing business results are suggested variables to be included 
in the model for the future research.
In order to make the selected financial perform­
ance indicators comparable among categories of 
firms, we have expressed their value in HRK per 
employee. One has to point out that the financial 
performance of firms by category is downsiz­
ing from large to small firms. That is observed 
already from the brief insight in financial results per 
employee for the latest year 2004. Total revenue per 
employee in small firms in 2004 was 410,438 HRK 
while total revenue per employee in large firms was 
743,886 HRK. Net profit per employee of small 
firms was also far below the net profit per employee 
in large firms. In year 2004, small firms in Croatia 
had net profit per employee (16,531 HRK) at about 
40% level of net profit per employee of large firms 
(38,607 HRK). Total sales per employee in large 
firms (698,586 HRK) in 2004 almost doubled aver­
age total sales per employee in small firms (389,653 
HRK).
Disparities between (worse) financial results 
of small and (better) financial results of large firms 
are evident for all years of observation (2002, 2003, 
and 2004) and for all three financial indicators per 
employee.
EMPIRICAL MODELLING
In the model of examining the relationship 
between corruption perceptions of business and the 
financial results of small, medium size and large
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firms in Croatia in the period from 2002 to 2004, 
we have used variables expressed as indices. The 
data on corruption perceptions and financial results 
per employee described in Section 3 are converted 
into indices, where the average for all firms is index 
100.
The annual index of corruption perceptions 
of business (CPB) for Croatia was calculated by 
summing the percentage of responses for all eight 
questions by the size of the firm and in total. We 
proceeded with calculating an average percentage 
of answers denoting higher corruption perceptions 
for all categories of firms (as previously shown in 
Table 5). Based on those shares, indices of corrup­
tion perceptions of small, medium-size and large 
firms were calculated for each year, where the 
weighted average of higher corruption perceptions 
responses of all firms is index 100.
The conversion to indices was also performed 
for total revenue per employee, net profit per 
employee and total sales per employee (the raw 
data in Appendix A). For example, total revenue per 
employee in HRK was for the each one category 
of firms -  small, medium and large -  expressed 
as index, where total revenue per employee for all 
firms in the year of observation is index 100. The 
same conversion to indices was applied to net profit 
per employee and total sales per employee.
The summary of indices of corruption percep­
tions of business and indices of financial results 
per employee for small, medium and large firms 
in Croatia for three years available are shown in 
Table 6.
Index of corruption perceptions of business in 
Croatia therefore denotes if corruption perceptions 
of three categories of firms are higher or lower than 
the total firms average corruption perceptions. In 
2004, CPB of small firms equated 119.2 indicat­
ing that corruption perceptions of small firms was 
19% above the average corruption perceptions of 
all firms surveyed in Croatia. On the contrary, CPB 
of large firms was 87.3% what denotes that large 
entrepreneurs in Croatia in year 2004 had corrup­
tion perceptions 13% below total firms average.
Similarly, index of total revenue per employee 
indicates if the total revenue per employee in 
small, medium and large firms is higher or lower 
than the average of total revenue per employee 
in all Croatian firms. For example, index of total 
revenue per employee in small firms in 2004 was 
68.8, indicating that total revenue per employee in 
small firms was 31% below the Croatian average. 
In the same year, large firms had total revenue per 
employee for 24.7% above the Croatian average.
Regarding the net profit per employee, in 2004 
index of net profit per employee for small firms 
(58.7) indicates that net profit per employee in 
small firms was 41.3% below the Croatian aver­
age. In the same year, large firms had net profit per 
employee for 37.4% above the Croatian average.
Index of total sales per employee also shows 
worse financial results of small compared to large 
firms. Index of total sales per employee in 2004 in 
small firms was 30% below the all firms’ average, 
while index of total sales in large firms was 24.4% 
above the average.
Table 6: Index of Corruption Perceptions of Business (CPB), Index of total revenue per employee, Index 
of net profit per employee, Index of total sales per employee; for small, medium and large firms in Croatia; 
in 2002, 2003, 2004
Firms CPB Index ot total revenueILL Index of net profit p.e. Index of total sales p.e.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
small 110.0 119.0 119.2 77.9 72.6 68.8 52.4 65.9 57.8 80.3 73.5 69.4
medium 105.3 94.2 78.1 89.9 92.5 92.5 60.5 80.4 79.8 91.3 92.5 92.0
large 87.5 73.1 87.3 120.1 122.4 124.7 151.2 132.2 137.4 117.1 121.7 124.4
all firms 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: authors’ calculation. Source of original data: for CPB-Opinion survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of 
World Economic Forum and Harvard University in Croatia, 2002., 2003, 2004; for financial results-Croatian Financial 
Agency FINA.
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Correlation analysis results
Our empirical analysis starts with examin­
ing the relation between corruption perceptions 
of business in and the financial results of firms in 
Croatia in year 2002, 2003 and 2004. The results 
of correlation analysis presented in Table 7 confirm 
there is a strong negative correlation between all 
three pair of variables. All correlation coefficients 
are significant at significance level of 5% (p< 0.05). 
There were nine observations included in analysis, 
three for each year -  for small, medium and large 
companies.
Table 7: Correlation between CPB and financial 
results of all firms in Croatia, 2002-2004
Variables Index of Corruption Perceptions of Rusiness
Index of total revenue p.e. -0.83
Index of net profit p.e. -0.72
Index of total sales p.e. -0.83
The correlation between Index of corruption 
perceptions of business (CPB) and Index of total 
revenue per employee as well as between CPB and 
Index of total sales per employee is very strong 
(coefficients -0.83) and of expected negative sign. 
The correlation between CPB and Index of net pro­
fit per employee is also negative, but slightly less 
strong (coefficients-0.72). Those findings confirm 
our hypothesis that regardless of firms’ size, the 
higher corruption perceptions of firms in Croatia are 
associated with worse financial results.
To deepen our research on stronger impact of 
corruption perceptions to small firms compared to 
the large ones, we have proceeded with the analysis 
of correlation between CPB and financial results 
of small, medium and large firms. Three separate 
correlation analysis were conducted, one for each 
company size. There were three observations in 
each analysis, one for each year (Table 8).
The correlation coefficients between CPB and 
Index of total revenue p.e. are of expected negati­
ve sign indicating that higher level of corruption 
as perceived by small firms in Croatia is strongly 
associated with lower total revenue per employee 
(coefficient = -0.89). For the same pair of variables 
for medium size firms, the correlation is slightly 
weaker but also negative (coefficient = -0.77). No 
corelation is evident in the case of large firms (coef­
ficient = -0.01).
The correlation between CPB and Index of net 
profit p.e. is hard to comment, given the positive 
and strong relation between this pair of variables for 
small (0.83) and large firms (0.72). On the contrary, 
the correlation coefficient for medium size firms is 
-0.79. One may speculate on accounting policies 
and other determinants of net profit as a financial 
indicator, but considering only three years of obser­
vations, it would be methodologically correct to 
re-test the correlation upon availability of consistent 
longer term data.
Index of total sales per employee and CPB are 
negatively correlated for all groups of firms. The 
correlation is very strong in the case of small firms 
(coefficient = -0.91), less strong for medium firms 
(coefficient = -0.49) and not strong for large firms 
(coefficient = -0.16). Those results are the most 
in line of our assumption that higher perceptions 
of corruption prevalence are more associated to 
worse financial results of small firms in Croatia. 
One has to note that total sales are considered as 
the less “subjective” financial measure of firm’s 
performance. In the literature the value of total 
sales per employee is considered as the one of the 
purest measures of firm’s output (McArthur and 
Teal, 2002). For this reason we believe that exami­
ning the relation between total sales and corruption 
perceptions might produce relevant findings of the 
harmful impact of corruption prevalence to the busi­
ness results of firms.
Table 8: Correlation between CPB and financial results of small, medium and large firms in Croatia, 2002- 
2004
Firm size CPB andIndex of total revenue p.e.
CPB and
Index of net profit p.e.
CPB and
Index of total sales p.e.
Small -0.89 0.83 -0.91
Medium -0.77 -0.79 -0.49
Large -0.01 0.72 -0.16
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We estimate that small number of observations 
is the main reason why correlation coefficients 
are not statistically significant. Future research 
should increase number of observations in order 
to further test the statistical significance of results. 
Continuation of survey conducted for GCR will 
ensure achieving that goal. However, we believe 
that with certain dose of caution, our findings could 
be accepted. Comments on coefficients provided 
above are important indication of corruption affec­
ting financial results of small firms. This is particu­
larly true for the total sales per employee.
CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the research of cor­
ruption as an obstacle of doing business. The 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey BEEPS 2002 results show the firms in EU 
new member states and candidate countries do not 
operate in corruption-free business environment. 
Croatia however, stands better of the selected group 
of countries average regarding the firms’ exposure 
to corrupt practices in regular business operations 
but about the average regarding the firms’ exposure 
to state capture. Those two dimensions of doing 
business in corruption infected environment, led us 
to examine the link between corruption perceptions 
of firms in Croatia and their financial results.
The selected responses from the interviews 
with managers of small, medium and large firms in 
Croatia in years 2002, 2003 and 2004 showed grow­
ing corruption perceptions, particularly regarding 
the political corruption. In 2004, 82% of managers 
considered that government officials favor well- 
connected firms when deciding upon policies and 
contracts. According to the opinion of more than 
a half of respondents, the embezzlement of public 
fiinds is occurring in Croatia. Violating the rule of 
law by paying bribes to protect their business inter­
est is a common practice, as estimated by 57% of 
respondents. Small firms are much more exposed 
to corrupt practices when asking for connections to 
public utilities, export and import permits, and loan 
applications.
The annual index of corruption perceptions of 
business (CPB) was constructed upon the survey 
responses for three categories of firms in Croatia, 
where the all firms average stands as CPB=100. 
CPB of small firms is above the average corruption
perceptions, while the CPB of large firms is below 
the all firms’ average. Small firms in Croatia have 
higher perceptions on corruption prevalence com­
pared to those of large firms.
For the same period, the financial results of 
firms differ by the size group of the firm. Worse 
financial results of small firms and better financial 
results of large firms are evident for all three indi­
cators of financial performance of Croatian firms: 
total revenue per employee, net profit per employee 
and total sales per employee.
That evidence led us to determine whether a 
link could be found between corruption perceptions 
of firms in Croatia and their underlying financial 
results. In a period from 2002 to 2004, there was 
a significant strong negative correlation between 
CPB and indices of total revenue p.e., net profit p.e. 
and total sales p.e. The prevalence of corruption as 
perceived by all firms in Croatia is strongly and sig­
nificantly associated to lower financial results.
The second part of our seminal research aimed 
to examine if corruption more affects small enter­
prises in Croatia. We have analyzed the separate 
correlation between CPB and financial results of 
small, medium and large firms. The coefficients 
indicate that higher corruption perceptions are nega­
tively and strongly associated to the worse financial 
results of small firms in Croatia, especially if total 
sales per employee stands as a measure of financial 
performance. Even though they are not statistically 
robust because of too little number of observations, 
we have considered of an utmost importance to 
comment on preliminary results. Indications on 
corruption being more associated to the worse 
financial results of small firms and less affecting 
large companies, call for early policy measures. The 
immediate anti-corruption policy targeting corrup­
tion-free business environment should be focused 
primarily on eliminating administrative barriers of 
doing business (Singer, 2005), thus eliminating the 
sources of corruption.
A suggested line of a future research is to test 
again the relation between corruption perceptions 
and financial results of three categories of firms in 
Croatia, when more data become available. In the 
extended empirical model, one should consider spe­
cific variables describing barriers of doing business 
in Croatia to be included.
Dr. sc. Jelena BUDAK, dr. sc. Edo RAJH: HOW CORRUPTION AFFECTS BUSINESS RESULTS: THE CASE OF CROATIA
Ekonomski vjesnik br. 1 i 2 (18): 5 - 16, 2005. 15
Appendix A. Number of employees, total revenue, net profit, total sales of small, medium and large 
firms in Croatia, in 2002, 2003, 2004
Number of 
employees














small 268,389 110,157 410,438 4,354 16,223 104,579 389,653
medium 156,407 86,053 550,186 3,507 22,422 80,790 516,535
large 386,980 287,869 743,886 14,940 38,607 270,339 698,586
all firms 811,776 484,079 596,321 22,801 28,088 455,708 561,372
2003
small 262,844 108,229 411,761 4,345 16,531 103,252 392,828
medium 158,971 83,354 524,335 3,206 20,167 78,562 494,188
large 375,081 260,365 694,157 12,443 33,174 243,991 650,502
all firms 796,896 451,948 567,135 19,944 25,090 425,806 534,331
2002
small 246,854 99,954 404,911 3,848 15,588 95,666 387,542
medium 156,715 73,297 467,709 2,817 17,975 69,051 440,615
large 350,617 218,992 624,590 15,758 44,944 199,201 568,144
all firms 754,186 392,243 520,088 22,423 29,731 363,920 482,533
Source: FINA Analiza financijskih rezultata poduzetnika RH u 2002, 2003, 2004. Net profit and total sales data were 
provided by FINA upon request.
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UTJECAJ KORUPCIJE NA REZULTATE POSLOVANJA: STUDIJA SLUČAJA HRVATSKE
Sažetak
Rad se zasniva na suvremenim teorijama o negativnim učincima prisutnosti korupcije na uvje­
te poslovanja. U cilju ispitivanja kako izloženost korupciji utječe na poslovne rezultate poduzeća u 
Hrvatskoj, u radu se provjerava hipoteza daje veća prisutnost korupcije prema percepcijama rukovodi­
telja malih, srednje velikih i velikih poduzeća u Hrvatskoj povezana sa slabijim financijskim rezultatima 
poduzeća. U radu se po prvi puta temeljem podataka istraživanja mišljenja rukovoditelja hrvatskih 
poduzeća za tri konsekutivne godine mjeri percepcija korupcije gospodarstvenika, i to pomoću izrađenog 
indeksa percepcije korupcije gospodarstvenika. Indeks percepcije korupcije gospodarstvenika u empi­
rijskoj se analizi koristi za ispitivanje kako viša percepcija korupcije u poduzećima u Hrvatskoj utječe na 
financijske rezultate iskazane ukupnim prihodom po zaposlenom, neto dobiti po zaposlenom i ukupnim 
prihodom od prodaje po zaposlenom. Godine opažanja su 2002., 2003. i 2004. godina. Istraživanje je 
prošireno na tri skupine malih, srednje velikih i velikih poduzeća u Hrvatskoj u cilju ispitivanja korelacije 
između indeksa percepcije korupcije gospodarstvenika i financijskih rezultata za svaku pojedinu skupinu 
poduzeća. Preliminarni rezultati analize ukazuju da korupcija više pogađa mala poduzeća u Hrvatskoj. 
Zaključno se navode preporuke mjera politike i smjernice nastavka istraživanja.
Ključne riječi: percepcija korupcije gospodarstva, financijski rezultati, Hrvatska
